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Bounce Protection:
Payday Lending In Sheep's Clothing?'
Bouncing a check is an embarrassing and expensive
process. When a consumer overdraws an account and one of their
checks bounces, they incur a fee (often in the $25-$30 range) from
the bank as well as a fee from the creditor to whom the check was
written. 2 In addition to this monetary consequence, the consumer
will also suffer the embarrassment of having to deal with the
creditor to ensure that the goods or services are ultimately either
paid for or returned.' This may also lead to a poor credit rating
and an injured reputation in the eyes of any creditors who received
a bad check.
Clearly, bouncing a check is a process that consumers
prefer to avoid. But what are the alternatives when a consumer
needs something before they have the funds to afford it?
Consumers who qualify can get an overdraft line of credit to cover
them. 4 With an overdraft line of credit, there is a written
agreement stating that the bank will cover the overdraft.5 Even
though the interest rates for overdraft credit lines are more stable,
and often have lower annual percentage rates (APRs) than bounce
protection, many consumers find the interest rates too high.6
Furthermore, this option is only available to a limited number of
consumers.7 Banks tend to only offer these lines of credit to
people with good credit reports.8 The natural consequence of this

1. See Steve Cocheo, Follow The Bouncing Check, A.B.A. BANKING J., Apr. 1,
2003, at 36 (quoting attorney Richard Nunez, former bank compliance officer).
2. Id. at 34.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Alan Kline, A Consumer Lobbying Power Turns Attention to Overdrafts, AM.
BANKER, June 6, 2003, at 1.
6. Id.
7. Id. Consultant John Floyd estimates that only 15% of consumers have checkbased lines of credit. Id.
8. Id.
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is that many of the people who are most in need of emergency cash
wouldn't qualify anyway. 9
Another alternative for the consumer who needs money
now, but does not have the available funds, is payday lending.
Payday lending is characterized by "small-dollar, short-term,
unsecured lending to borrowers experiencing cash flow
difficulties."1 Consumers will "borrow against their paychecks by
postdating personal checks in exchange for cash-and service
charges."'" For instance, if a consumer needs $100, they can write
a check to a payday lender for $115 and then get the $100 right
away. 12 Two weeks later, the payday lender would then cash the
$115 check.'3 "Because these loans have such short terms to
maturity, the cost of borrowing, expressed as an annual percentage
rate (APR), can range from 300% to 1,000%, or more."' 4 In states
where payday lending is allowed, the related fees are often greater
5
than what state laws allow.'
Many banks now offer bounce protection services as a
method of allowing consumers to spend money they don't yet
have. 6 These services are designed to cover a consumer who
overdraws an account or writes a bad check.' 7 When a customer
overdraws an account, the banks will cover the debt and charge a
fee which is usually in the amount of $20 to $30.8 Certain banks
also charge a daily fee (generally $5 per day) until the consumer's
9. Id. Since nonsufficient funds (NSFs) go on your credit report, customers who
have insufficient funds tend to have poor credit reports, and thus would fail to qualify
for overdraft lines of credit. Id.
10. Barbara A. Monheit, The Regulators Speak: Materials Submitted by Barbara
Monheit, 1361 PLI/Corp. 459, 501, Jan. 29, 2003.
11. Thomas A. Wilson, Note, The Availability of Statutory Damages Under TILA
to Remedy the Sharp Practice of Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 341
(2003).
12. Id.
13. Id. Most payday lenders make the bulk of their money through rolling over
loans, however. And, according to consumer groups, many consumers roll over their
loans an average of seven times. The consumer must then pay the fee over and over
again each time the extension is made. Id.
14. Monheit, supra note 10, at 501.
15. Id. at 504.
16. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 32.
17. Laura K. Thompson, Bank Overdraft Programs Rankle Consumer Groups,
AM. BANKER, May 20, 2003, at 4cb.
18. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
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account reaches positive balance. 9 Banks then deduct the amount
covered plus fees from the customer's next deposit. 2' Bounce
protection services are distinguishable from traditional overdraft
credit lines in two ways. First, bounced checks are honored at the
discretion of the banks instead of a prearranged guaranteed
protection as with traditional lines. 2' Second, customers generally
do not sign an agreement for bounce protection services, which are
often offered as a "courtesy" by the banks.22
While it provides a short-term solution for consumers who
need to make a purchase now, but don't have the available funds
to cover it, bounce protection exposes consumers to many of the
same pitfalls as payday lending. 23 Like payday lending, the
calculated APR for bounce protection is potentially
astronomical.24 Consider, by way of example, the customer who
overdraws by $50.25 If the fee is $25 and he pays it back in seven
days, the APR would be 2,607%.26 If he repays the debt in two
weeks, then the APR is 1,104%, or if he repays it in 30 days, then
the APR is 608%.27 Also, many consumers become mired in
rollover fees with payday loans.28 Similarly, those using bounce
protection incur the $30 fee every time they make a purchase until
their balance is returned to zero. 29 And with banks who charge the
daily fee, consumers may rack up huge debts,30 presenting the
19. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, Bounce
Protection:How Banks Turn Rubber Into Gold By Enticing Consumers To Write Bad
Checks, at http://www.consumerfed.org/bounceappendix0l2803.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2004).
20. Id.
21. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
22. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
23. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 18.
24. Elizabeth Renuart, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 13 (Mar. 13,
2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/
2003/200303/march03transcript.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 341.
29. See Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
30. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
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possibility for the very same downward financial spiral as payday
loans.3
It is no surprise then, that consumer groups and other
critics of bounce protection services argue that the services are
predatory and in need of regulation.32 Jean Ann Fox, director of
consumer protection for the Consumer Federation of America
(CFA), says "bounce protection is payday lending done by
banks., 3 3 Even some bank consultants have indicated that bounce
protection programs are the banking industry's response to payday
loans.3 4 One consultant, in an effort to convince bankers to offer
bounce protection, stated that:
Some bank customers are driven by convenience
and the need for short term funds. They are willing
to pay for the privilege of spending money they
don't quite have yet. Somehow, these customers
will get the money they need. Wary of the uncertain
consequences of overdrawing their checking
account, many pay routine bills late and incur late
fees, many also choose to patronize payday loan
outfits, cash checking services and the like. The
result? Your customers are paying big fees to meet
their simple banking needs, but not to you. With
the OverdraftHonor program, you can give your
customers an alternative, one that saves them
money while dramatically increasing your fee
income.35

31. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 341.
32. See Michelle Heller, ABA's Advice: Tread Lightly, AM. BANKER, May 20,
2003, at 4cb. In a recent memo, C. Kendrick Fergeson, the ABA's chairman-elect,
gave bank executives the following warning: "Done carefully, automated bounce
protection programs can be good for your customers and for the banks. But without
understanding how your program will be seen and judged in your community, in the
agencies, and in court, it could become your worst nightmare. If you offer one,
proceed with caution and make sure you do it right." Id.
33. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
34. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
35. Id. (quoting Consultant BSG).
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Bounce protection certainly has increased the fee income
for banks offering the service.36 According to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the banking industry made $30.7
billion on overdraft service charges last year, up 13% from 2001. 37
One bank reported that approximately 30% of its customers have
been charged bounce protection fees.38 In a recent ABA Banking
Journal Community Bank Competitiveness Survey, 43.4% of
banks surveyed offered fee-based overdraft plans, and 70.6% of
participating banks reported that the service was a major source of
revenue. 39 These staggering numbers make it easy to see why
many banks would offer the service. The numbers also suggest
that there is clearly a consumer demand for the service.
Bounce protection serves a similar function as payday
lending, operates in a similar fashion, and presents similar financial
consequences for consumers."
Yet bounce protection is not
governed by the same strict TILA standards as payday lending. 1
Absent a compelling reason to treat them differently, or
consumer-friendly modifications made by banks, bounce
protection should be governed by the same TILA guidelines that
govern payday lending. This note will discuss how and why they
are treated differently. It will also consider whether it is sound
public policy to treat them differently and suggest modifications
that could make bounce protection services safer and more useful
to consumers, while limiting the potential liability that banks
offering the service may face.
Part I of this note will examine the uses and abuses of
bounce protection services.42 Part II of this note will discuss how
bounce protection is designed to avoid regulation by TILA and
Regulation Z, and potential legal limitations of the services.4 3 Part
36. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Cocheo, supra note 1, at 32.
40. See generally Wilson, supra note 11 (explaining the purposes, operation, and
consequences of payday lending); Cocheo, supra note 1 (explaining the purposes,
operation, and consequences of bounce protection).
41. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
42. See infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 80-176 and accompanying text.
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III will consider how to include bounce protection under TILA,
and the potential ramifications of doing so.4 Part IV of this note
will consider the ways in which banks could temper their bounce
protection practices in order to offer better protection to
consumers, insulate the banks from potential liability under the
current law, and avoid more stringent regulation by lawmakers.45
I. THE USES AND ABUSES OF BOUNCE PROTECTION SERVICES

A.

Benefits of Bounce Protection

Bounce protection presents several important advantages
for many consumers. 46 The consumer can avoid paying the
merchant fee and the embarrassment of bouncing a check.4 7
"What the customers love about it, is that when they give the
drugstore a check, we'll pay the bank's normal overdraft fee and
they don't have to be embarrassed by going back and paying
another fee at the store."48 At the same time, banks are paying for
items that consumers may need and that may otherwise be
impossible for them to purchase.4 9 For instance, a consumer can
pay the electric bill and know that the electricity won't be shut off
due to insufficient funds. Finally, consumers who don't balance
their checkbook have some form of backup to ensure that they
don't have to deal with bouncing a check.5 ° "[I]f we take away the
overdraft privileges or we put in so many rules and regulations, the
person that suffers in the end is the consumer."'" Mr. Abbate
argues that with so many people failing to balance their
checkbook, pulling the rug out from under bounce protection
44. See infra notes 177-190 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 191-216 and accompanying text.
46. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 33-34.
47. Id. at 34.
48. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb (quoting Charles Snipes, President of Bank
of Granite).
49. See e.g. Cocheo, supra note 1, at 33.
50. See Anthony Abbate, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting
at the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 16 (Mar.
13, 2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts
/2003/200303/marchO3transcript.pdf.
51. Id.
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plans would cause confusion and hassle for consumers and banks
alike.52
B.

The Criticisms and Abuses of Bounce Protection

This section of this note will explore three major criticisms
of bounce protection as it currently operates: 1) it entices poor
consumers to use money they do not have,53 2) many people do not
ask for the service or even know that they have it,54 and 3) it lacks
consumer safeguards.55
1. Enticing Poor Consumers
A recent article by the CFA and the National Consumer
Law Center (NCLC) calls bounce protection services "deliberate,
systematic attempts to hook consumers onto overdrafts as a form
of high cost credit."56 Fees for overdrawing an account were
originally intended to discourage consumers from spending more
money than they really have, but as the service currently operates,
it encourages some of them to spend more than they have.57
One advertisement lures consumers with the temptation to
"Access Your Paycheck Before You Have It ' 58 By consistently
honoring the checks of "chronic overdrafters," even when the
bank knows or should reasonably know that the consumer is mired
in financial trouble, certain banks are preying upon their most

52. Id.
53. See Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
54. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
55. Daniel P. Stipano, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 914, Sept., 2001, at 6,
availableat http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/sep01/int914.pdf.
56. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
57. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb (quoting Jean Ann Fox, director of
consumer protection for the Consumer Federation of America).
58. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19 (citing a bounce protection advertisement found on the web site of First
National Bank & Trust Company, Oklahoma).
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vulnerable consumers.59
These same vulnerable consumers,
entangled in a downward spiral of playing catch-up with all the
fees, often incur the non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees over and over
again."0 One bank consultant estimated that 80% of a bank's
overdraft income is derived from the same 15-25% of customers.61
Another figured that about 4% of customers were responsible for
half of all NSF fees.6 2 The CFA and NCLC conclude that "this
group of probably disproportionately low-to-moderate-income
consumers is carrying the weight of the huge run-up in overdraft
63
income for banks.,
Customers can easily go to the ATM and withdraw money
that is in effect a loan.6 Similarly, debit cards will continue to
work even when the customer's funds are exhausted.65 Chi Chi
Wu, staff attorney with the NCLC, said that this amounts to more
than just a courtesy. 66 Wu says that this makes the service
essentially a short-term loan which should be subject to TILA
disclosures. 67 The fact that bounce protection extends to ATM
and debit cards tends to support the claim that banks entice
customers to overdraw, rather than simply coming to their aid
when they write a bad check.
2. Some Consumers Are Unaware That They Have Bounce
Protection
While some consumers may be enticed into using bounce
protection at the ATM as a type of loan, others may overdraw at
the ATM or through use of a debit card without even knowing that
their own funds have expired.68 Some banks have set a limit of
59. Id. One bank consultant admitted that low-income individuals are more
likely to use bounce protection, stating that in "areas of high unemployment, higher
unemployment, you typically have more activity." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
65. Id.
66. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
67. Id.
68. See Kline, supra note 5,at 1.
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$500, up to which they will protect a consumer.6 9 However, this
amount may be displayed at ATMs as part of the available account
balance,7" encouraging some consumers to unknowingly dip into
their credit line, and incur a non-sufficient funds (NSF) fee.7
Customers do not sign up for the service, rather, it is
designated as a "courtesy" by the bank, and customers who choose
to opt out of the service must notify the bank of this decision.72
Because banks avoid entering into written agreements for the
service (which would subject it to TILA disclosure requirements),
many customers are never informed that they have bounce
protection.73 Failure to inform consumers that they have the
service undermines the congressional goal of having informed
consumers with the ability to comparison shop.74

3. Lack of Consumer Safeguards
In an interpretive letter, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) lists several aspects of bounce protection that
exemplify a lack of consumer safeguards:
1) "an unlimited number of overdraft charges could
be levied during a thirty day period as long as the
consumer does not exceed the dollar amount
limitation on overdrafts,"7 2) there is "no cooling
off period following repayment of overdraft charges
during which no overdrafts will be paid, thus
increasing the likelihood that a customer will
consciously resort to use of this product to pay for
ordinary day-to-day expenses,"76 3) there is "no
69. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19 (citing a Cicilian Bank advertisement).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2003). "[T]he purpose of this regulation is to
promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms
and cost." Id.
75. Stipano, supra note 55, at 6.
76. Id.
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grace period (for instance, 24 hours) during which
the customer can reimburse the bank without
incurring the NSF charge after receiving notice that
a check was paid,, 7 7 4) banks make "no effort by
banks... to identify customers who are writing
overdraft checks regularly as a means of meeting
regular obligations in order to attempt to serve their
needs with more economical alternatives,"78 and 5)
"no effort by banks offering the program to inform
customers generally of available alternatives for
short-term consumer borrowing, explain to
customers the costs and advantages of various
alternatives to the program, or identify for
customers the risks and problems in relying on this
product and the consequences of abuse." 79

II. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON BOUNCE PROTECTION

This section will explore the potential legal limitations on
bounce protection services. First, it will examine TILA and how a
court may determine that bounce protection may be governed by
truth-in-lending disclosures in the same way that payday lending is,
or the potential action that lawmakers may take in order to ensure
that TILA governs bounce protection.8" Second, it will examine
the ways that federal and state usury laws may limit bounce
protection services.81 Third, it will examine how bounce protection
may violate laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practice.82

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 83-158 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 159-167 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 168-176 and accompanying text.
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The Truth-in-Lending Act

The Truth in Lending Act is the piece of legislation that is
most likely to limit bounce protection services. There are several
elements of TILA that warrant consideration. This section will
first examine the statute, along with Regulation Z.84 Second, it will
examine the ways in which bounce protection in its current form
slips through loopholes in the act, and how judges and lawmakers
could reasonably find that bounce protection should be covered.85
Third, it will take a look at what the Consumer Advisory Council
has said about the issue.86 Finally, it will look by way of analogy to
the way that TILA governs payday loans.87
1. The Statute
"[TILA] came into existence in 1968 to provide a remedy
for consumers injured by lenders."88 Congress passed TILA to
"standardize the mechanism for communicating the terms of
consumer credit agreements, which in turn serves to advise
borrowers of the cost of credit."89 TILA, as implemented by
Regulation Z, reflects the intent of Congress to provide consumers
with uniform cost disclosures to promote the informed use of
credit and assist consumers in comparison shopping. 90 This
purpose is furthered by applying the regulation to transactions that
fall within the statutory definition of credit. 9' In order to achieve
its goal of educating consumers seeking loans, TILA has strict
disclosure requirements for loans. 92 Lenders who fail to follow all

83. See Stipano, supra note 55, at 1.
84. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 94-129 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 139-158 and accompanying text.
88. Wilson, supra note 11, at 343.
89. Id. (quoting Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay out of Payday Loans: Putting
an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday
Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2001).
90. See Clement v. Amscot, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1299 (M.D. Fl. 2001).
91. Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b); see also Wilson, supra note 11 at 344.
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of the requirements subject themselves to liability for financial
injuries suffered by those who take out the loans.9 3
2. How Bounce Protection Slips Through TILA Loopholes
Banks offering bounce protection services naturally would
prefer to avoid compliance with all of the TILA disclosure
requirements, considering the unusually high APR that bounce
protection services often yield. 94
For this reason, bounce
protection services have been carefully crafted to prevent the plans
from being categorized as finance charges. 95 If the plans do not
qualify as finance charges, then banks will likely be free from the
TILA requirements, and free from liability that may result from
96
violations thereof.
One key indicator that something constitutes a "finance
charge" is a guarantee of insurance or protection against an
obligor's default or other credit loss. 97 In response to this, banks
reserve discretion whether to cover a customer's overdrawn
account balance; thus, there is no guarantee that the banks will
cover the consumer in the event of an overdrawn account.98
Consumer groups note, however, that advertisements for the
service consistently contradict the industry's assertions that bounce
protection is "discretionary." 99 The CFA and the NCLC point to
several examples of this:
Benton Bank Company states "The newest addition
to our line of services is Free Checking and
93. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 344. Within the context of payday lending
TILA cases, many suits have been brought as class actions, opening the door to a
radical multiplier effect. Id.
94. See Renuart, supra note 24, at 13-14.
95. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
96. See Stipano, supra note 55, at 1.
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2000).
98. See Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19. While there do not appear to be clear guidelines as to how banks exercise
discretion regarding which checks to cover, each bank sets its own criteria for
participation in the program. Banks generally require that a consumer have an
account open for a certain time, that there are regular deposits into the account, and
a lack of defaults or levies. Id.
99. Id.
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Overdraft Privilege. Overdraft privilege gives you
the peace of mind that your checks will be honored,
up to an overdraft of $500 ($300 for Free
Checking)!"' ° Similarly, First Community Bank of
Washington asserts that "you will know that your
checks, ATM withdrawals, Visa Check Card
Purchases, and other transactions will be honored
up to your Bounce Protection Limit. Remember,
checks drawn up to the limit will not be returned,
saving you the embarrassment and expense
This
associated with the returned check fee.
privilege can save you money." 10

The OCC points out that many banks specify in the fine
print (and often on the back of marketing materials) that they
"may refuse to pay an overdraft for you" and that the service is
being rendered as a "non-contractual courtesy."'0 2 In spite of this,
many customers are confused by the apparent promises in the
advertisements that the checks will be covered.10 3
Another "loophole" in TILA through which banks fit
bounce protection is that "charges imposed by a financial
institution for paying items that overdraw an account" do not
amount to finance charges "unless the payment of such items and
the imposition of the charge were previously agreed upon in
writing."' ' In order to exploit this exemption, banks do not have
customers sign any contractual agreements in relation to this
'
service. 05
Two federal cases from the Southern District of Mississippi
illustrate the way that banks have effectively slid bounce
protection services through the TILA loopholes in order to
prevent recovery by plaintiffs. In Taylor v. Union PlantersBank of

100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Stipano, supra note 55, at 3.
103. Id.
104. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(3) (2000).
105. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
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Southern Mississippi,1° 6 the plaintiffs wrote a bad check, and, in its
discretion, Union Planters chose to honor it. 1°7 The plaintiffs were
then charged daily overdraft fees typical of some bounce
protection plans upon becoming overdrawn. 1 8 The plaintiffs, who
were not informed about the fees prior to their accounts being
charged and had never authorized the charges, brought suit
alleging that TILA required the bank to disclose such fees as
finance charges.0 9 At issue in the case was whether the imposition
of the daily overdraft fee was covered by Regulation Z and
therefore subject to TILA." ° The bank argued that an exception
to Regulation Z applied since the service was offered as a
"courtesy" and was never agreed upon in writing.' The plaintiffs
claimed that the Official Comments to section 226.4(b)(2) provide
that such an overdraft fee is a finance charge.' 12 The court in
Taylor was not convinced by the plaintiffs' argument, and held that
the "in writing" exception applied here." 3 The same exception
won the case for the defendant bank in Terrell v. Hancock Bank."14
These loopholes appear to allow banks to continue this
service without being subject to TILA." 5 However, a closer
examination of the relevant definitions in TILA"16 and
congressional intent in enacting TILA"l suggests that bounce
106. 964 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
107. Id. at 1121-22.
108. Id. at 1122.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See 964 F. Supp. 1120 at 1123-24.
112. Id. at 1123. Plaintiffs relied on Official Comment to 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(2),
which provides as follows: "A service charge of $5.00 per each item that triggers an
overdraft credit line is a finance charge." Id. (citing Official Comment 4(b)(2)-1 to
12 C.F.R. § 226.4). Plaintiffs argued that the daily overdraft fee is akin to the $5.00
service charge referred to in the comment "because the fee is triggered only when the
bank extends credit to the consumer." Id.
113. Id. at 1124.
114. 7 F.Supp.2d 812 (S.D. Miss. 1998).
115. See Jeff Gelles, Payday Loan Masquerades as Protection, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 2, 2003, at E01.
116. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a). Regulation Z defines finance charges as "the cost of
consumer credit as a dollar amount. It includes any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to or a condition of the extensions of credit." Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §
1605(a) (2000).
117. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b).
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protection should be covered." 8 While the court in Taylor
declared that the overdraft fees were not finance charges, it
neglected to say what the charges were." 9 It is important to
examine the definitions of "credit" and "finance charges" to see if
they are broad enough that a court may reasonably find that TILA
covers bounce protection services.
The court in Clement v. Amscot, 120 a payday lending case,
explained the definition of credit as follows: "credit is defined the
same by the TILA and Regulation Z as 'the right granted by a
creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and
defer its payment."'"12' When customers use bounce protection,
they are deferring payment, and, as a result, incurring debt. 22 This
is why there is such a strong argument that it should qualify as
credit.

123

Were it not for the exception for services not agreed upon
in writing, the definition of "finance charge" would appear to
accurately describe bounce protection. 124 A "finance charge is the
cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount. 125 It includes any
charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a
condition of the extension of the credit."' 126 At a recent meeting of
the Consumer Advisory Council, one view expressed was that:
[I]f you look just at the statute, it looks like these
would be considered finance charges, which would
render them credit.... They would be considered a
finance charge and, therefore, these are credit
products, because people have gotten cash. A debt

118. See Nessa Eileen Feddis, Will We Kill A Useful Service?, A.B.A. BANKING J.,
Apr. 1, 2003, at 38.
119. See Taylor, 964 F.Supp at 1124.
120. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
121. Id. at 1296 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14)).
122. See Consumer Federation of America, National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
123. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
124. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
125. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).
126. Id.
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has been deferred, and it is due within up to 30 days
by the terms of the agreements. While not in
writing, because again vendors are trying to slide
under the Truth in Lending radar screen, there's
writing, because there's advertisements and there's
127
written materials.
Given how accurately these definitions appear to describe
bounce protection services, a court may be inclined to look to
congressional intent despite the notable exceptions exploited by
the banks. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, judges and
policy makers may hesitate to offer more protection to a bank that
charges customers without their knowledge or written consent than
one that clearly informs its customers of their options and services.
It may be reasonable for a judge or lawmaker to consider bounce
128
protection fees to be finance charges, and thus covered by TILA.
Even if bounce protection fees are not adjudicated to be finance
charges, banks should be wary that the Federal Reserve Board
may close these loopholes and subject bounce protection to TILA
disclosures. 129
3. Where Does The Federal Reserve Board Stand?
The Federal Reserve Board is considering this issue.13 °
While the usefulness of bounce protection remains unquestioned,
in its current state the service is garnering considerable unwanted
127. Renuart, supra note 24, at 5-6.
128. Mark Pinsky, in his remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, had
this to say: "It sounds an awful lot like a credit line.... I can't figure out how it's not
a loan.... [M]aybe I'm being too simplistic about it, but I just - It doesn't connect
for me. I can't figure out what else you could call it." Mark Pinksy, Remarks at the
Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at the offices of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, at 22 (Mar. 13, 2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/2003/200303/marchO3transcript.pdf.
129. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb. In a March 28, 2003, press release, the
Fed said that "board staff is continuing to gather information on these services and
will determine at a later date whether additional guidance for financial institutions is
warranted under Regulation Z." Id.
130. See Transcript of the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, (Mar. 13, 2003)
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/2003/
available at
200303/march03transcript.pdf.
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attention from the Federal Reserve Board. 3 ' The Board has been
soliciting comments 3 2 for some time now in an attempt to
determine if bounce protection should be subject to the same
TILA requirements as overdraft lines.'33
On March 13, 2003, the Consumer Advisory Council met at
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in Washington, D.C. to discuss bounce protection. 3 4 The
Council reached a general consensus on the importance of being
honest and up front with customers.'35 Council members also
agreed that the service can be good for some consumers, but
people "should not be encouraged to write NSF checks on money
they don't have.' 36 The Council could not agree on what type of
disclosures should be made to customers. 37 Oscar Marquis
summed up the proceedings:
I think where we had a disagreement was on the
kind of disclosures that should be made to
consumers.
Should they be told - They are
currently being told what the fees are. They are
being told that they are paying $25 for the coverage
of the NSF check or whatever the fee is. Should
that be converted into an APR or not? It seems to
me, that's where the discussion - where we couldn't
really come together. Maybe the staff and the Fed
38
can tackle that one.

131. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
132. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 32 (noting that over 200 comment letters have
been filed thus far).
133. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
134. See Transcript of the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, supra note 130.
135. Oscar Marquis, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at the
offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 25 (Mar. 13,
2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/
2003/200303/march03transcript.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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4. How Does TILA Handle Payday Lending?
Bounce protection has been called a "loan in sheep's
139
clothing, and a potential way of gouging poor people.'
Consumer groups argue that bounce protection is no different than
a loan and, as such, should be subject to Regulation Z's TILA
disclosures of annual percentage rates and specific credit terms.14 °
Chi Chi Wu, staff attorney with the National Consumer Law
Center, points to the fact that consumers can go to the ATM and
withdraw what is essentially a loan. 4 ' Similarly, debit cards will
continue to work even when the customer's funds are exhausted.'4 2
According to Wu, this goes beyond a "courtesy to prevent
embarrassment," and essentially amounts to a short-term loan
which should be subject to TILA disclosures. 4 3 Considering the
similarities between bounce protection and payday lending, a
strong case can be made that they should be subject to the same
guidelines and requirements under TILA. In order to shed some
light on how bounce protection might operate under TILA, this
section will examine the similarities between bounce protection
and payday lending and the way that TILA deals with payday
lending."
Consumers can use either payday lending or bounce
protection to get access to money when they don't have enough in
their account.'4 5 Each of these practices operates in a similar
fashion: pay extra fees later for the right to use money now.' 46 The
effects on consumers are also similar: both payday lending and
bounce protection can lead a consumer to become buried in debt,

139. Cocheo, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting Attorney Richard Nunez, former bank
compliance officer).
140. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
141. Id.
142. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
143. Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
144. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 343.
145. Id. at 339 (explaining how consumers can use payday lending to access
money); see Cocheo, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining how consumers can use bounce
protection to access money).
146. Wilson, supra note 11, at 341 (explaining how payday lending operates); see
Gelles, supra note 115, at E01 (explaining that a consumer may overdraw an account
if they later pay a hefty fee).
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while the fees keep piling up.'4 7 Similar justifications are provided
by the proponents of
each service: it's better than the alternative
1 48
check.
a
bouncing
of
Given the strong similarities between the two practices,
absent some compelling reason to the contrary, they should be
subjected to the same TILA guidelines. To ascertain the potential
ramifications of either finding that bounce protection should be
covered by the current version of TILA, or expanding TILA to
ensure that it explicitly covers bounce protection, one must
149
examine how TILA governs payday lending.
"Courts have universally rejected the idea that payday
loans should not be considered credit just because the interest
charged is couched in terms of a fee."15 Payday lenders are
indeed subject to the disclosure requirements of TILA, 5 ' and case
law has confirmed that lenders can be held liable for violations of
TILA requirements. 52 Further, suits for TILA violations may be
brought as class actions, ensuring that plaintiffs with claims that
would otherwise be too small to litigate will get their day in
court.153 When it comes to damages for payday lending TILA
violations, class action suits tend to involve statutory damages,
although there is a split among the courts as to whether statutory
54
or actual damages is the appropriate remedy.

147. Wilson, supra note 11, at 341 (explaining how payday lending may cost
consumers large amounts in rollover fees); Stipano, supra note 55, at 6 (noting that
there is no limit to the number of overdraft charges that may be levied in a 30 day
period, so long as the consumer does not exceed the dollar amount limitation on
overdrafts).
148. Wilson, supra note 11, at 342 (noting that defenders of payday lending say it
is likely cheaper than bouncing a check); Cocheo, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that
defenders of bounce protection say it is cheaper than bouncing a check).
149. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 343.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 344.
152. See Mitchem v. Am. Loan Co., Inc., No. 99-C1868, 2000 WL 290276, at *2
(N.D. Ill. 2000); Van Jackson v. Check 'N Go of Illinois, Inc., 123 F.Supp.2d 1079
(N.D. Ill. 2000).
153. See Smith v. The Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325 (7thCir. 1999); Stewart
v. Associates Consumer Disc. Co., 183 F.R.D. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Mayo v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 148 F.R.D. 576 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Simon v. Omni Leasing, Inc., 146
F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
154. Wilson, supra note 11, at 345-47.
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Courts have been clear that payday lenders will be held
accountable for violations of TILA requirements.' 55 This should
serve as a warning to banks offering the similar service of bounce
protection. It appears that one of two things could happen rather
easily: either a judge could find that bounce protection is covered
by TILA, or lawmakers could amend TILA to explicitly cover
bounce protection. 15 6 If either one of these possibilities occur,
banks who continue to offer bounce protection services would
expose themselves to suits for violations of the TILA
requirements, and many banks would stop offering the service
altogether.'57 It is clear that this type of activity can be regulated
by TILA." The question for judges and lawmakers is whether
bounce protection warrants stricter regulation, or if the positive
elements of the service justify the continuing "hands-off"
approach.
B.

State Usury Laws

Austin L. Roberts, III, president and CEO of Bank of
Lancaster, Kilmarnock, Va., refuses to offer bounce protection to
his customers.' 59 He acknowledges that many bankers claim their
customers love the service, but concludes that "at the end of the
day it gets to be usurious."' 6° A usurious loan is one whose
interest rates are determined to be in excess of those permitted by
16 1
usury laws.
The elements of usury are a loan or forbearance of
money, understanding that money loaned shall be
returned, payment or agreement to pay rate of
155. Id. at 344.
156. This would mirror the response to payday lending issues: "the Federal
Reserve Board recently added a comment to TILA's regulations that unequivocally
states that payday lending is to be considered an extension of credit subject to the
requirements of TILA." Wilson, supra note 11 at 343.
157. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
158. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 343 (explaining that TILA governs payday
lending).
159. Cocheo, supra note 1, at 32.
160. Id.
161. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999).
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interest greater than that allowed by law, and
corrupt intent to take greater return than that
62
allowed by law for use of money loaned.
If bounce protection is deemed to be a loan, as urged by
consumer groups, 163 then the interest rates would likely exceed
those permitted by states that place a limit on the amount of
interest that may be charged,' 64 and the results could be
devastating for banks. For instance, in North Carolina, a knowing
violation of usury laws shall result in:
[F]orfeiture of the entire interest which the note or
other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has
been agreed to be paid thereon. And in case a
greater rate of interest has been paid, the person or
his legal representatives or corporation by whom it
has been paid, may recover back twice the amount
of interest paid in an action in the nature of action
for debt.'65
Furthermore, each payment of usurious interest gives rise
to a separate cause of action to recover penalty therefor, so that
one customer may have many separate causes of action.'6 6 Within
the context of a class action suit, these damages could multiply
exponentially. 67
'
162. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37 (1981), rehearing
granted 303 N.C. 320, on rehearing 304 N.C. 191. "Corrupt intent" which is required
for usury is intentional charging of a rate of interest which is greater than that which
is allowed by law. 303 N.C. at 47. It is not necessary that the offender intended to
violate usury laws. Mere intention to take interest called for in loan or forbearance
agreement suffices. Id.
163. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (2003) (providing that "the legal rate of interest
shall be eight percent (8%) per annum for such time as interest may accrue, and no
more").
165. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-2 (2003).
166. See Henderson v. Security Mortg. & Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253 (1968) (noting
that such action is barred by the statute of limitations at the expiration of two years
from such payment).
167. See Henry v. Cash Today, Inc., 199 F.R.F. 566 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (allowing for
class action suit to be brought in the case of a "usurious" payday loan).
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Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices

C.

Section 5 of the FTC Act provides: "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared
'
unlawful."168
Bounce protection services carry with them the risk
of being viewed as unfair or deceptive."' A major point of
criticism of bounce protection lies with the fact that consumers
may not know they have the service. 7 ° As a result, customers may
make ATM withdrawals without knowing that they don't have the
money until they receive a bill for the fees.'7 1 This may trigger a
violation of statutes barring "unfair and deceptive trade practices,"
which tend to be broad and leave room for interpretation. 172 Most
plaintiffs bring these cases under state statutes, because the FTC
Act does not provide a private right of action. 173 N.C. Gen. Stat.
section 75-1.1(a) provides: "[U]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Plaintiffs who can
show that such unfair or deceptive acts proximately caused actual
injury may receive an award of damages. 174 In addressing
prohibited acts by debt collectors, the North Carolina statute
provides that in private actions, civil penalties may reach up to
If bounce protection were found to be unfair or
$2,000.175
deceptive, the prospect of paying out $2,000 per violation to each
plaintiff would likely cause banks to simply stop offering the
service.

1 76

168. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
169. See JoAnn S. Barefoot, New risk profile: The flap over bounce protection
demonstrates clearly the new breed of compliance risks banks face, A.B.A. BANKING
J., Apr. 1, 2003, at 67.
170. Id. at 69.
171.

Id.

172. Id.
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
174. See Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Assocs., P.A., 155 N.C. App. 738, 743, 575
S.E.2d 40,44 (2003).
175. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-56 (2003). Although in this circumstance, treble
damages are not available. Id.
176. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
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III. ENVISIONING How TILA WOULD COVER BOUNCE
PROTECTION

Unless bounce protection services are modified and
consumer safeguards are added, the services should be covered by
TILA.'7 7 Closing the "in-writing" and "guarantee" loopholes in
order to cover the loans requirements would cast too broad a net.'78
Instead, lawmakers should do what they did to ensure that payday
lending was covered: add a sentence to the TILA commentary
making it explicit that bounce protection services are covered.179
In order to do so, the difficult issue of the fluctuating APRs
of bounce protection must be addressed. With bounce protection,
APRs fluctuate greatly depending upon the time it takes a
consumer to pay off the fees. 8 ° Some have suggested adapting the
disclosure requirement for bounce protection to require disclosure
of the fee, but not necessarily the APR.' 8 ' Since the goal of
congress was to inform the consumer,'82 this suggestion could be a
very good one. The most important thing is not necessarily that
the APR is disclosed, but rather, that consumers are provided with
information that allows them to understand what they are getting
into."' At the Consumer Advisory Council meeting, Clint Walker
summed up this point:
You do a historical APR calculation that, you know,
even though it is required by law... does not
provide meaningful information to them. They see
6,000 percent APR. They go, what is happening
177. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
178. If there were no exceptions, then anytime someone made any type of loan to
another person, the lender would be held to the rigorous disclosure standards of
TILA. There is nothing to suggest that Congress intended for an individual making
an informal loan to make APR disclosures, for instance. See generally 12 C.F.R. §
226.1(b).
179. Wilson, supra note 11, at 343
180. See Renuart, supra note 24, at 13.
181. See Clint Walker, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at the
offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 18 (Mar. 13,
2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/
2003/200303/march03transcript.pdf.
182. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b).
183. Walker, supra note 181, at 18.
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here. They get confused. They make phone calls.
They really haven't gotten any information. I think
the important thing to do is make sure that the fee
disclosure is given up front so that they know what it is
they are paying. You know, that they understand.184
There are other consequences of applying the current
TILA regulations to bounce protection that lawmakers must
consider. Considering all of the detailed requirements of TILA,
many banks may be deterred from offering the service at all.185 It
would simply present too great a risk of litigation.186 The service
would no longer be available to many customers. While non-bank
lenders still offer payday lending,'87 bounce protection services are
directly linked to a consumer's bank account, so if the banks are
scared off, then the service may cease to exist.'88 To effectively
eliminate a service that many consumers want to keep would not
be ideal. Therefore, much of the responsibility for keeping this
service falls upon the banks themselves.'89 If banks change bounce
protection services to better safeguard consumers, then the need
for congressional intervention would be alleviated. 9 °
IV. How BANKS COULD TEMPER BOUNCE PROTECTION SERVICES

Bounce protection can be a very useful service that saves
customers money, hassle, and embarrassment. The majority of
customers probably don't want to forgo this service. 9 ' Given its
propensity to generate revenue, it is certain that banks do not want
to stop offering the service. 9 ' If banks wish to preserve this useful
and profitable practice, they would be well advised to proactively
184. Id.
185. Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
186. See Wilson, supra note 11, at 344 (noting that TILA is so detailed as to render
complete compliance difficult).
187. Id.
188. See generally Cocheo, supra note 1 (noting that bounce protection formalizes
the traditional courtesy of paying insufficient checks).
189. See Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 38.
192. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
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self-regulate and consider modifying it.'9 3 The Federal Reserve
Board seems to recognize that bounce protection is a valuable
service, but is concerned that as it currently operates, the service
may require regulation."' If banks made some consumer-friendly
changes now, it might save them from potential governmental
regulations or even possible legal claims.195 In the long run, it
would make financial sense for banks to modify bounce protection
in order to keep the prosperous service alive in the future.'9 6
Taking into account the many criticisms of bounce
protection, it seems that banks should take action on two fronts:
consumer education and consumer safeguards.'97 Perhaps the
most important improvement is to better educate consumers.' 98 If
banks are confident that people like this program, then banks
should let them know what it is and how it works.' 99 Banks should
make clear that there are no guarantees that bad checks will be
covered. 2 ' To this end, advertisements of the service should avoid
contradictory statements such as "The Bank will automatically
pay,"' 20 1 or "Don't worry, we've got you covered., 20 2 Also, banks
should not represent overdraft limits as available balance at the
ATM, unless these funds are clearly tagged so that the consumer
knows exactly what he or she is doing when choosing to overdraw
an account. 0 3 Similarly, steps should be taken to ensure that debit
card users understand that just because their transaction clears at
the registers, this does not necessarily mean that their account has
available funds. 2°
193. See Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
194. See Kline, supra note 5, at 1.
195. See Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Benson Roberts, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 21 (Mar. 13,
2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/2003/
200303/march03transcript.pdf.
199. See Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Consumer Federation of America/National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 19.
203. Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
204. Id.
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Banks should continue to make clear that there is a fee for
this service, but try to distinguish this fee from a loan. 2 5 This
might be a difficult task given how similar bounce protection looks
to a loan, but banks have a legitimate interest in avoiding
disclosures of APR for bounce protection.2 6 Considering that
bounce protection is an open-end product with potential
transactions every day, it is virtually impossible to come up with an
APR in the same way as in closed-end credit, and when the APR is
calculated for bounce protection, it is often very high.20 7
Banks should carefully review their advertising materials to
ensure that they avoid the appearance of "enticing" customers.2 8
This is a major point of criticism from consumer groups, and if
banks could avoid the perception that they are luring customers,
that could go a long way in preserving bounce protection
services. 2 9 All advertisements are generally designed to entice
consumers, so it may be difficult for banks to advertise the product
without being accused of "enticing" people to use it. 210 Still,
"enticement" is an element of the service that has been uniformly
criticized, and banks may do well to re-think their advertising
approach.21
"'
Banks could alter the perception of enticement by
educating consumers about alternatives which may make more
financial sense in the individual consumer's situation.1 2 Possible
alternatives include automatic drawing into a more traditional line
of credit or into a savings account when a customer overdraws a
checking account.2 13

205. Id.
206. Earl Jarolimek, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at the
offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 9 (Mar. 13,
2003) available at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/
2003/200303/marchO3transcript.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
209. Id.
210. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 4cb.
211. Id.
212. See Stipano, supra note 55, at 6.
213. Thomas FitzGibbon, Remarks at the Consumer Advisory Council Meeting at
the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at 17 (Mar. 13,
2003) availableat www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/adviscoun/cac/transcripts/2003/
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While consumer education is the most important area in
which banks could make changes, some of the safeguards
suggested by the consumer groups may warrant consideration and
could be very effective in pacifying the Federal Reserve Board.
Banks ought to place some limit on the number of overdrafts a
customer may incur in a given period.1 4 There also appears to be
no mechanism by which banks attempt to identify people who are
abusing bounce protection services and becoming buried in debt.1 5
If banks made some effort to prevent abuses of the service, they
could defend themselves better against consumer criticisms and
perhaps keep bounce protection services free from more stringent
regulation in the future.216
V. CONCLUSION

Bounce protection's usefulness in certain circumstances is
unquestioned,2 7 but lawmakers need to take a hard look to
determine if there is a compelling reason to treat bounce
protection any differently from payday lending. Unless bounce
protection is altered to become safer for consumers, there does not
appear to be sufficient justification for allowing it to remain free
from TILA's regulatory guidelines. 21 8 Though TILA may have to
adapt to adequately regulate bounce protection, unless banks can
amend the services, they are in need of further regulation.1 9
Banks should take reasonable steps toward keeping this
moneymaker and popular consumer service intact.22° If they do so,
then perhaps judges and lawmakers will continue to let the
200303/march03transcript.pdf. (describing a "suite of services" that banks could offer
as alternatives to bounce protection).
214. See Stipano, supra note 55, at 6. While there is a limit on the total overdraft
amount for which the banks will cover customers, there is no limit on the number of
overdrafts. See id. If a given individual, either intentionally or by mistake, were to
use an overdrawn debit card to buy lunch every day for a week, he would incur
approximately $200 in fees (assuming that the fee is $25-$30 per overdraft). See id.
215. See id.
216. See Feddis, supra note 118, at 40.
217. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 33-34.
218. See generally Feddis, supra note 118 (noting the usefulness of bounce
protection and suggesting consumer-friendly changes to the service).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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In
thriving service continue without further regulation 2 '
modifying the services, bank executives should consider the advice
of C. Kendrick Fergeson, who warned that "before you offer a
bounce protection product, decide if you'd want to defend the one
in your local newspaper or to your
you're considering
2
22

regulator.E
OWEN B. ASPLUNDH

221. Id.
222. Heller, supra note 32, at 4cb.

